Due to something or other at the time, I didn't have a chance to comment on my reactions to reading Brennan's chapters 5 -7. So instead, I'll do it here. Brennan is, as always, difficult to read. Her ideas are interesting of course, but some of them seem are rather difficult to get a hold of. What I'm going to do now is wrestle with one of these that confused me, in textual form. Brennan argues that when you judge someone, you "simultaneously direct toward her that stream of negative affect" that cuts off the "feeling of kinship from her as a fellow living, suffering, joyful creature (118)." Brennan expands upon this by saying that this is done to objectify the other. Once you believe that the target to be judged lacks the vital qualities that you value, encouraging the projection of affects that you yourself reject. In other words, you say "these affects do not exist in me, but in her (119)" and at that point you are able to feel better about yourself while thinking of the other as inferior. This is of course projection as it has been long acknowledged, which occurs on both the personal and larger scales, which Brennan acknowledges. What I am unsure about here is the use of the word Judge and the breadth of the statement she is making here.
Brennan says that "when one judges, one is possessed by the affects (119)" she directly compares this with discerning, which is where one detaches from the affects to understand. Discernment, when in opposition to your judgment, "registers as a feeling (120)." I see this as making discernment a secondary characteristic, a backup plan to judgment, which is an interesting way to place discernment. What this all implies then is that judgment is entirely affective - it is a skin reaction as other authors we read would say. It is precognitive, responding to the affects existing in the broader situation that you are partaking of. It is then mediated by your cognition and "intelligent reflection (120)" into a secondary position on the target, your discernment. If this mediation produces a similar result to the original affective impact, it reinforces it, if it disagrees it produces a dissenting feeling that may or may not be acted upon. Articulating this result "requires a vocabulary (120)" which is why we "defined feelings as sensations that have found a match in words(120)." Exploring and discovering the roots of this feeling is an even more complex endeavor that I won't go into here. Overall, this idea is a frustrating one due to its implications, and Brennan expands upon it during the chapter. A rational person typically does not want to believe the extent of the affective response is that powerful, but there is certainly plenty of evidence in our everyday lives to tell us that Brennan has a point. You just have to hope that the judge behind the courtroom bench is sufficiently capable of exploring his own feelings before he slams down the gavel...
