Ahmed's discussion of the Terrorist and his place in the economy of fear is a particularly interesting section of the reading, but I actually think that it could be taken a step farther. The origins of 9/11 are complex and I wouldn't dare to try and discuss them comprehensively in a short blog post like this, but there are some peculiar similarities that I think we could examine.
Greatly simplifying things to an almost criminal degree, the explosion of modern Islamic Fundamentalism can be traced back to the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s. A religious social organization that had occasional militant leanings, the Muslim Brotherhood sought to bring the Qur'an and Islamic religious ideals into the modern era as the center of life for Muslims. In 1952 the Muslim Brotherhood supported the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser, a westernizer that sought to free Egypt from Imperialist influences secularize, and modernize the Middle East to compete with the rest of the world. One of Nasser's first movements was to outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood, and then later crack down on it incredibly brutally.
One of the men that suffered under this was Sayyid Qutb. Qutb is an interesting and important case. Well educated, Qutb had spent several years visiting the United States which, in combination with Nasser's later policies, would form the foundation of the ideological background of Jihad. He termed the theory of “Modern Jahiliyya” the concept of modernity as New Barbarity(Sivan 23), and viewed modernity as an incompatibility with Islam that would destroy their culture and people. The horrendous tortures inflicted upon Muslim Brotherhood members at the hand of modern, westernized nationalists under Nasser provided a shining example for Qutb's work. Naturally, this concept did not belong solely to Qutb, but his experiences with the materialism, indulgence, and, in his mind, loose morals, of the early 1950s in America created a particular fear within him. He looked west and saw for Muslims a future of “unbridled individualism, dissolution, depravity” and moral and social decline(Sivan, 24). In order to throw off “Modern Jahiliyya” radical change was needed – a Jihad against modernity to “reestablish the Kingdom of God upon Earth(Sivan 25).” These ideas, which spent time maturing in Egyptian prison cells, would eventually be set free. While Qutb was put to death shortly after, his works spread profusely, particularly in Saudi Arabia and to a young man by the name of Osama bin Laden.
Long winded as that may have been, the point here is that the Terrorist who works to strike out at societies of “individual freedom, religious intolerance, democracy and the international flow of free commerce (Ahmed 128)” does so out of fear for consumption and spending destroying his own values. It is a curious mirror. For us the vision of 1950s USA is a wholesome memory of simpler times. For Qutb it was a vision of societal decay, decadence, and loose morals that would provide no future. His revulsion at this later became connected with the violence and secular nature of Nasser's government to create an incredibly strong affect.
Ahmed says that “fear's relationship to the potential disappearance of an object is more profound than simply a relationship to the object of fear (Ahmed 125).” For Qutb and later Bin Laden, it is not the west and its decadence that frightens them, it is the fear of their traditional values being swept away and “Modern Jahiliyya” holding dominion over Muslims as they saw in Nasser's reign. This creates the strong drive necessary for such horrible acts that, in turn seek to create opposite fears on the other side. One really has to marvel at how interconnected such economies of fear truly are.
Emmanuel Sivan. Radical Islam – Medieval Theology and Modern Politics. Yale University Press: London.
I definitely agree with your post, and the different sides of terrorism that Ahmed does not cover. I didn't really see him mentioning the other side at all, but perhaps he just wanted to discuss our view of terrorism and how it brings fear to us all.
ReplyDeleteHe writes one particular line that says "the slide between figures constructs a relation of resemblance between the figures: what makes them alike may be their unlikeness from us." Ahmed's using this in the sense of so-called terrorists compared to U.S. citizens, but I wanted to use it for terrorists only. He goes on to talk about how random Islamic, Arab, and South Asian men are much more prone to being security checked than anyone else.
So by saying "what makes them alike may be their unlikeness from us" reads that they almost have to form some sort of group, whether it be terrorists or just normal people we've pushed them into this group. I think it sort of connects with what you were saying because we don't really look at their view of things, just ours.
That's an interesting point about 1950s USA, and perhaps a further example of last week's reading about how different things appear differently to different people. We see it as nostalgia; Qutb saw it as the beginning of the end.
ReplyDeleteIt's sad how the cycle of fear perpetuates itself-- and also sad how humans can simply refuse to let someone else live in a different manner to themselves. It's easy to wonder how things might have been different if Nasser (among others) could have said, "Fine, you go your way and I'll go mine" and everyone could have been okay with that. I'm not sure that it's possible for everyone to be okay with that-- I think the modern term is "celebrate our differences"-- can it really happen?
I think your post does a good job of outlining the specific, historically unique details surrounding the figure of the terrorist that is missing from Ahmed's post. While she does a similar analysis in relation to the figure of the white supremacist, I think she takes advantage of her theory of the substitutability of the figures of the racialized other for the terrorist for the asylum seeker. I definitely think though that its true that acts of terrorism occur not as a result of a specific form of hatred on the part of the terrorists but as an act of alignment with a collective body. In this case in alignment with protecting the traditional values that are fundamental to a pious Islamic way of life. They are more afraid of the loss of an authentic relationship to their religion and the damage that could be done to future generations of muslims than they are of particular U.S. figures.
ReplyDeleteI wonder though, do you think that families in some of the cities in Afghanistan and Iraq have the same relationship to U.S. soldiers as we do to terrorists. I don't mean this as a universal but, Ahmed seems to be getting at the point that our relationship to the figure of the terrorist is distinct because it lacks a stable referent, in the case where Afghani rebels know that U.S. soldiers are there to kill them is the relationship to fear the same? Or perhaps its different for say those that are on the fence in Afghanistan, for example the family that doesn't know whether the U.S. soldier will treat them with care or will harass them?
@Reed: Ahmed is a female, no?
ReplyDeleteI don't think that any affective economy is going to be the same for a particular entity, as I do not believe that an affective economy is experienced the same way for any individual. I think that the terrorist/U.S. soldier is represented in a collective manner, but there would be no way to compare these economies. There would probably be no way to accurately understand these economies. I think that what Ahmed describes exists, but is difficult to put in tangible terms. While we can attempt to do this, as we do with ideologies and such, there is not objective accuracy when trying to describe these economies.
nice post, I don't know why every big terrorist attacks why Muslim people are backed either it is 9/11 attack, Mumbai local blast, Parliament attack at new Delhi and the Mumbai attacks all of the place are targeted by Muslim people's.
ReplyDeleteCriminal Justice Degree